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During the last decade, with the advent of multiple acts of terrorism
perpetrated by Al Qaeda and other global militant networks, it has
become clear that classical just-war theory does not give very clear
directives-even in the unlikely event that leaders of threatened
peoples would care to consult JWT before determining their response!
The traditional paradigm for JWT envisions a conclusion, by a
threatened nation, that a hostile nation or hostile nations are gathering
forces against it. This conclusion may be based either on clandestine
intelligence or overt acts of aggression. Calculations are then made by
the threatened nation: Is there a bona fide threat, or is it mere
bluffing or chest-thumping? Have all diplomatic means been explored
to defuse the threat? Will military defense possibly cause more
damage than succumbing to the aggressors? Have proper procedures,
in a democratic and constitutional system of government, been
followed for engaging in war? Then, if these considerations for jus ad
bellum have been satisfactorily answered, and hostilities are begun,
subsequent questions about conduct during war, jus in bello, must be
addressed: Noncombatants must be distinguished from combatants;
prisoners of war must be dealt with in a just manner; pillaging,
massacres, and torture must be avoided by the defending forces.
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Such ethical guidelines concerning war would be difficult or
impossible to adhere to, in many contemporary situations. Terrorism
rather than traditional war-making has become the strategy of choice
by peoples or groups either unable to mobilize conventionally enough
force, or possibly considering terrorism more effective, because of a
"David vs. Goliath" military perspective. Terrorist attacks extend the
idea of guerrilla warfare to its ultimate limits, "pulling out all stops" to
confound, demoralize, defeat, and even exterminate the enemy. When
terrorism is adopted as the strategy of choice, it is to the advantage of
the terrorists to studiously avoid having any unified identifiable hostile
force, or being situated in some specific geographical location, or even
being linked with a specific nation. Forces that are organized,
uniformed, and marching under a flag, and thus identifiable, are out of
the question; weaponry (or the lack of it) must be a matter of
guessing by the other side. And terrorist threats must always be as
vague as possible, with no clear verifiable danger to the military forces
of the enemy. The result optimally will be complete confusion by the
enemy as to which specific civilian or military persons or groups on
their side could be subject to attack, and need to be defended–no
matter how just a defense would be. In other words, the imperative
need to defend would be coupled with complete uncertainty as to what
needs to be defended. But to defend everything is, of course,
impossible.
In past decades, when the MAD strategy of the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union prevailed, the vague
threats of total nuclear annihilation were thought to serve as a
deterrent, on the presupposition that the enemy would be logical and
non-suicidal. But this presupposition, if it ever made sense, can no
longer be taken for granted. The clandestine leader of a terrorist
nation or worldwide network might be willing to risk certain retaliation
on his subjects or collaborators–and even himself. The consequences
could be madness in a literal sense, extrapolated to global dimensions.
A complicating factor in trying to apply just war theory is that
each side typically considers itself justified. But even if the jus ad
bellum conditions could be satisfied for terrorists, it is unthinkable that
jus in bello could be maintained. Random massacres of men, women,
and children of a targeted group contradict instincts of justice and
fairness in almost any moral and legal context. And the wholesale
abandonment of considerations of justice becomes particularly acute in
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the case of suicide bombing. Occasionally apologists compare suicide
bombing to heroic acts which sometimes take place in war, where a
soldier will sacrifice his life, e.g. by falling on a live grenade, to save
his comrades. But there is no similarity. The suicide bomber is not
defending comrades, but participating in a nihilistic act of annihilation
both for himself and his targets, which usually or frequently consist of
noncombatants–even noncombatants who might sympathize with his
or her cause.
When questions are raised about the morality of suicide
bombing, justifications are given: These are acts of desperation by
oppressed peoples, driven to extreme defensive measures; and,
morality aside, there are supervening religious considerations, edicts
and mandates by respected religious leaders who encourage and
praise such acts as "martyrdom" leading to especially enticing
heavenly rewards in the afterlife. And when confronted with the
question of the murder of innocent noncombatants, the apologists for
suicide bombing will often assert that in their special struggle, there
are no "noncombatants." In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
the argument is that the enemy, Israel, is a militaristic country,
completely mobilized, whose military "force" includes all males and
females, young and old–all of whom perpetuate and assure, in various
ways, according to their capacities, the oppression of Palestinians;
even children are future combatants. Incidents against the United
States, such as the massacre of September 11, 2001, are claimed to
be ultimate and necessary extensions of the terrorist strategy–the U.S.
being "fair game," since it is the ally offering indispensable support for
Israel's continuing aggression. In short, the extermination of a whole
population (the perpetrators would never use the term, "genocide")
can be justified in this manner: Children are seen as future enemies to
the existence and progress of the oppressed people; noncombatant
adults and even the elderly can be portrayed as ideological proponents
of further hostilities, or at the minimum as "fellow travelers"; and the
constant threats of random acts of terror may interfere so drastically
with normal living patterns and be so impermeable to ordinary military
approaches, that the enemy will eventually leave the disputed
territories willy-nilly.
The infractions of natural law in suicide-bombing strategy are
almost intuitively obvious, requiring very little argument or painstaking
theoretical applications: The most intuitively relevant principle, of
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course, is the "law of self-preservation," which inculcates a strong
responsibility for maintaining one's own life, as well as the inalienable
right to do so, and to continue living. It takes no great efforts at
ratiocination to see that this law also implies a responsibility for not
taking the life of others, as well as the right not to be threatened with
extermination by others. The natural law of preserving the species is
also relevant; it is certainly in the background of the general
consensus of civilized people against genocide. A person who asks,
"so, what's wrong with genocide (or "ethnic cleansing") is simply not
on an ethical plane at all, and certainly manifesting symptoms of
ethical imbecility. Finally the natural law of acting rationally, and
extending this tendency to creating and maintaining rational social
interrelationships, is probably the most important tenet of the natural
law relevant to the case of suicide bombing, and the law most
seriously threatened by the infractions of suicide bombers. Progress in
the history of civilizations has only been possible by continual
extensions of rational social interaction, superseding the inevitable
dynamics of power, greed, aggrandizement, selfishness, and vanity.
Suicide bombing seems to constitute such an outrageous
infraction of natural law that one wonders how fellow humans, sharing
the same nature, could possibly embrace it in all its nihilistic
overtones. Natural-law arguments, and any universal moral
considerations, are relevant as challenges to politically-motivated
suicide bombers, such as the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka or the
female resistance fighters in Chechnya. But morality is considered
irrelevant by those who feel they have a religious mandate to commit
such acts, such as Islamicist proponents of suicide bombing–including
even many Muslim academicians. In a tradition like the modern
Western tradition, which recognizes the distinction between ethics and
religion, and the distinction between politics and religion, an ethicist
might get a hearing. But in the eyes of the strict Islamicists who
defend suicide bombing, there is no such distinction. Islamic law,
sharia, is final and complete for all time. There is no code of ethics
which can supplement it; no national or international laws valid in their
own right, simply as a result of rational deliberation and agreement;
no political power separate and distinct from religious authority, and
capable of coordinating and protecting rights of a variety of religious
persuasions. In short, suicide bombing is a crystal-clear example of
the problem of a theocracy which becomes identical with morality, law,
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and politics. If the tenets of this theocracy are irrational and immoral,
this is not an argument against it; it is not subject to reexamination or
criticism based on rational considerations.
In the context of Western philosophy and ethics, the problem of
suicide bombing can best be considered as a subset of the larger
problem of the relationship of ethics to religion and vice versa: Does a
religion have a right to enjoin acts which are irrational and immoral?
Or does the religious person have the converse right–even a Godgiven right–to analyze the tenets of a religion for conformity to reason,
and to resolutely discountenance any religious directives which go
clearly against reason and ethics? Historically, and even at present,
religions have justified or even recommended blatant infractions of the
natural law-child sacrifice, female genital mutilation, cannibalism,
ritual suicide of widows, as well as genocidal destruction of all other
religions. If such practices are authoritatively justified by a religion,
and not just attributable to the excesses of individuals, can and should
a rational observer come to the conclusion that that religion is ipso
facto invalid, not divinely inspired, but to be resolutely avoided and
discountenanced?
The locus classicus for this problematic in the Judaeo-Christian
tradition is of course the case in Genesis 22:2, in which Yahweh
commands Abraham to slay his son, Isaac, and Abraham
unquestioningly prepares to perform the act, being prevented only by
a divinely-sent last-minute angelic reprieve. Jewish and Christian
philosophers and theologians have wrestled for over two millennia with
this story and their responses range from Kant's rejection of the
authenticity of the story (since of course God would never command
anything unethical like murder) to Kierkegaard's interpretation in
terms of the "teleological suspension of the ethical" by faith (leading to
a relativization of even ethics and rationality in face of the absolute
divine "paradox"). Thomas Aquinas, most of whose life-long efforts
were directed at showing the compatibility of faith and reason, in
response to the objection that God's command to kill Isaac is against
the natural law, answers that such a situation would be a "limiting
case" for natural law: if God, the author of nature and life, commands
someone to be killed, it is no longer unnatural or immoral; he argues
in the same vein regarding other Old Testament narratives in which
God commands the Israelites to steal from the Egyptians (Exodus
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12:35), or commands Osee to commit adultery (Osee 1 :2) (See the
Summa theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 5, ad 2).
Even if we agree with Aquinas about the supervening morality of
a divine command, the ultimate question that arises would be, does
God really command it? In a previous work, I have argued that a valid
religious command must pass ethical muster, and that cases such as
Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac must be understood in terms
of the evolution of conscience in ancient times (see Ethics in Context,
Georgetown University Press, 1988, p. 122), which might have
involved the unconscious projection of divine mandates. In any case
this may be a challenge strictly relegated to the individual level,
defying any ethical universalization, a question that must be dealt with
only rarely by individual prophets or seers–such as Abraham, Joshua,
Osee, Mohammed, Joan of Arc, Joseph Smith, or (in recent decades)
the six young people in Medjugorje who claim to have had frequent
messages from the Virgin Mary. To them, conscience should suggest,
"is this from God, or from my overactive imagination or my personal
agenda?"
Moving from the individual situation to the more universal
question: what defense can sincere believers (and the human race)
have against false prophets and mindless religious authorities that
claim to be passing on a command from God to kill, for example, all
the members of a certain ethnic group, or religion, or to carry out
other abominable acts? Certainly the "grammar of assent" for religious
commitment would include a more than cursory examination of natural
law. And if there are degrees of unnaturalness and immorality,
certainly a religion whose recognized authorities preach "kill, kill, kill"
has gone beyond the possible parameters of the individual exceptions
Aquinas defends, and must be rejected by any thinking person.
A major danger is that we who consider ourselves tolerant and broadminded should come to view suicidal acts splattering all bystanders to
pieces as just one more legitimate expression of religious faith–an act
given extra legitimation by stressful political and military realities. The
shudder that we feel in extending this line of thought to its limits is
normal, understandable, nothing to be ashamed of, a sign that religion
and sanity are not contradictory.
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